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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LDS HOSPITAL, a Division of
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/
Appellant,
vs.
JOEL MILLER, MARSHA MILLER, and
CAPITOL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No. 20990

Defendants/
Respondents.
INTER-MOUNTAIN CLINIC, INC.,
Plaintiff/
Appellant,
vs.
JOEL MILLER and CAPITOL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants/
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the
lower court erred in granting a Summary Judgment to Defendant,
Capitol Life Insurance Company, and in denying a similar
Summary Judgment to Plaintiff.

Specifically, this case

involves the interpretation of a clause contained in a health

and accident policy issued to defendant Marsha Miller, wife of
Joel Miller.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent concurs with the stipulated Statement of Facts
contained in the Brief of Appellants.

(Appellants1 Brief, pp.

2-4) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The lower court was correct in finding that the exclu-

sion contained in the health and accident policy was applicable
to the facts of this case in that the insured/ Joel Miller, was
injured as a causal result of conduct arising out of a felony.
2.

The language contained in the health and accident

policy was not ambiguous. While Appellants may concoct conflicting constructions of this clause, such concoctions are
inapplicable to the present situation and are, therefore,
irrelevant as to any claim of ambiguity.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE
PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE INTERPRETATION IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE EXCLUSION IN THIS CASE
PRECLUDED THE CLAIM OF JOEL MILLER.
Respondent does not dispute the general principles of law
enunciated in Appellants' Brief relating to the interpretation
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of insurance contracts.

(Appellants' Brief, pp. 5-11).

There

is no doubt that ambiguous insurance contracts are construed
against the insurance company and that exceptions to the contract must be proven by the insurance company.

Additional

principles of insurance interpretation should also be noted.
The rights of the parties rests on the insurance contract as
written, and courts should not indulge in forced construction
so as to cast upon the insurance company liability which it has
not assumed.
1977).

Kozak v. DAIIE, 262 N.W.2d 904 (Mich. App.

Unambiguous policy language should be given its plain

and ordinary meaning.

Insurance policies should be read with

the meaning which ordinary laymen would give to the words.
Southland Saslor v. Homelife Ins. Co., 416 So. 2d 867 (Fla.
App. 1982).
The language contained in Miller's accidental and health
policy excluded coverage for the commission of certain acts
which the insurance company declined to insure because of
public policy reasons.

These "unlawful acts" provisions are

valid and enforceable.

As stated by one authority:

Policies of life and accident insurance often expressly provide that no recovery shall be had thereunder in case of death or injury while engaged in, or
in consequence of, a violation of law or the commission of a crime, or contain some provision covering
some form of unlawful or wrongful act. Such a provision is valid and enforceable. In cases arising under
policies containing a provision limiting, or relieving
the insurer from liability where the insured was, at
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the time of his death, committing or participating in
a felony, it has frequently been held that on the
basis of the evidence presented recovery on the policy
was precluded as a matter of law. 43 AM. JUR. 2d
§580, Insurance, p. 646.
The lower court correctly applied the principles cited both in
Appellants' Brief and the additional principles cited herein and
reached the conclusion that the insurance policy issued by Capitol
Life Insurance Company did not cover the injuries sustained by Joel
Miller.

The application of these principles will now be discussed

in relation to the arguments raised by Appellants.
POINT II
DEFENDANT CAPITOL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
SATISFIED ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE AS WELL AS
THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
INSURED'S INJURIES AND THE VIOLATION OF THE
LAW.
The policy issued to defendant Miller specifically excluded
any medical coverage for injuries "arising out of an attempt at
assault or felony." It is undisputed by the parties that on
October 23, 1981, defendant Miller killed Robert L. Heinz by
driving his automobile into Heinz on the freeway.

Furthermore,

it is undisputed that at the time of the accident Miller was
legally intoxicated.

Finally, it is undisputed that Miller

pleaded guilty to a second degree felony of manslaughter for
recklessly causing the death of another•
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Appellants attack the conclusion that since Miller pleaded
guilty to a felony the exclusion contained in the insurance
policy was applicable and coverage was therefore properly
denied,

(Appellants' Brief, p. 11).

Instead, Appellants rely

upon a circuitous argument that, while a felony was in fact
committed, such commission did not cause Miller's injuries.
(Appellants' Brief, pp. 12-14).

The argument advanced by

Appellants is similar to that used by the National Rifle
Association by proclaiming "Guns don't kill people, people kill
people."

To sustain the arguments raised by either Appellants

or the National Rifle Association, it is necessary to discard
certain facts and causes in order to reach the conclusions
urged by the various advocates.

While the process will allow

the results claimed it does so only at the loss of a logical
causal connection which cannot be legitimately eliminated in
the interpretation of an insurance policy.
Appellants argue that Miller was injured as a result of an
automobile collision.

At that point in time, according to

Appellants, no felony had occurred by the mere intoxicated
driving of Miller and the violent collision with the Heinz
automobile.

The argument then continues, that only after Heinz

died five minutes after the accident did a felony actually
arise and, therefore, it cannot be said under any theory that
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Miller sustained injuries "arising out of" the felonious act.
(Appellants1 Brief, p. 14).
Paralleling this argument is a similar one which would be
advanced by gun advocates.

In a barroom brawl one person pulls

out a .25 caliber pistol and points it at his adversary.

He

pulls the trigger, the gun goes off, a bullet is fired and the
adversary falls dead from a bullet in the heart.

The gun advo-

cate would state that the real cause of death to the adversary
was not the gun but was the person holding the gun since if he
had not pulled the trigger the gun would not have gone off.
Superficially, both of these arguments may make some
sense.

A thoughtful analysis shows that both are equally

fallacious.

In the gun example, it is true that the person

pulling the trigger initiated the events leading to the adversary's death.

Had this person not had a working gun, had the

person not had proper ammunition, or had the person not aimed
the gun properly, the mere intent to harm the adversary would
have resulted in no injury.

Thus, no injury occurs whenever a

person either has an inadequate weapon but has an intent to
harm, or has a lethal weapon but does not attempt to use it.
The true causal connection for the adversary's death, therefore, requires both a belligerent person and a working weapon.
Both are the factual cause of the adversary's demise.
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In the instant case a similar analysis can be made.

The

felony of manslaughter did not factually occur merely because
Mr. Heinz died.

Rather, it occurred because defendant Miller

reckless collided with Heinz in an automobile thereby causing
Heinz' death.

Both the collision and the death were elements

causally required in order for a charge of manslaughter to be
made.

It is completely illogical to focus upon the moment of

Mr. Heinz1 death rather than upon the event which caused the
death.

It was the initial collision in which defendant Miller

sustained his injuries which proximately caused the death of
Heinz and the manslaughter charge to be filed.

Thus, the true

focus of inquiry must be the acts giving rise to the moment of
impact since the collision was the "event" which initiated the
manslaughter conviction.

It is immaterial whether Mr. Heinz

died at the moment of collision, five minutes after the collision, or a month after the collision in determining whether
Miller's injuries arose from a felonious act.

Once Mr. Heinz

died, an otherwise non-felonious collision became felonious and
the resulting injuries, by definition, had to arise from that
felony.
Several other courts have correctly dealt with similar
cases.

In Barker v. California Western States Life Ins., 61

Cal. Rptr. 595 (Cal. App. 1967), the insured had come from a
party in which he had been drinking heavily.
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He was driving

his automobile on the wrong side of the freeway when he
collided with another vehicle.
driver were killed.

Both the insured and the other

An autopsy from the insured's body showed

that he was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident.

A

policy of life insurance on the insured stated that the company
would not be liable for any loss to which a contributing cause
was the insured's "commission or attempt to commit a felony."
The Court of Appeals upheld the finding of the lower court
which denied coverage to the widow of the insured, based upon
the exclusionary clause.

The Court found that a felony had

been committed since all of the elements required for a drunk
driving felony were present -- namely, the driving of a vehicle
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the negligent driving of the vehicle, and an injury or death to a third person.
In Mainer v. American Hospital and Life Ins. Co., 371
S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1963), the lower court found that the decedent's death had been caused by a head-on collision while the
decedent was driving on the wrong side of the road while intoxicated.

The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the

insurer was not prohibited by law from including in its accidental death benefit rider, a limitation of coverage such that
the accidental death benefit would not be paid where the
insured died "while committing an assault or felony."

The

limitation was given full effect and the beneficiary was denied
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recovery.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas affirmed the

lower court's decision.
Appellants rely upon the Colorado Supreme Court case of
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 418 P.2d 50 (Colo. 1966),
in making the causation arguments.

This case supports the

contents now made by Appellants but it is submitted by Respondent that the case is not well-reasoned and should not be
followed by this Court.

The reasoning of the Colorado Supreme

Court is flawed, much like the previous gun-person example.
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that it was the automobile
accident which killed the insured, not the fact that the automobile accident was legally termed a felony at the time it
occurred, since a third person was injured.

The Court chose to

look at the direct cause of the decedent's death, i.e., the car
collision, rather than to look at the overall picture that the
car collision was deemed felonious under Colorado law and,
thus, under the terms of the policy the decedent's death
directly or indirectly resulted from the commission of a felony.
The Court of Appeals in California also rejected this type
of causal reasoning.

In Romero v. Volunteer State Life Ins.

Co., 88 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Cal. App. 1970), the court cited the
Colorado Supreme Court decision and compared it with the Barker
decision, supra.

The Court of Appeals stated:
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[The Colorado Supreme Court] reasoning is wholly out
of harmony with Barker, and accordingly cannot have
our approval; nevertheless the Colorado decision
assumes importance here because it emphasizes the fact
there must be some causal relationship between the
death of the insured and the commission of the
felony. Id. at 823.
In Romero, the insured, while intoxicated, crashed into a
pillar causing his death within seconds. A short time later a
second vehicle collided with the wreckage, at which time that
driver was injured.

The California Court of Appeals concluded

that the death of the decedent could not be deemed to have been
in connection with a felony since his death preceded any injury
to another person which was a required element of felony drunk
driving.

In other words, the injury to the second driver was

too remote in time and in proximate causation to be deemed an
essential element to the felony drunk driving offense.

The

Court approved, however, the decision in Barker, in which such
remoteness was not present and the exclusion was held
applicable.
A further contrast in interpretation of causation can be
seen by examining the cited case of Appellants Schwartz v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 233 A.2d 416 (N.J. Super. 1967)
(Appellants' Brief, p. 13), and McDaniel v. Country Life Ins.
Co., 417 N.E.2d 1087 (111. App. 1981).

Both cases involved

deaths of insureds who were fleeing police officers. Both
cases involved injuries to passengers who were in the vehicles
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at the time the chase occurred.

Both cases involved similar

clauses which excluded insurance coverage to an insured whose
death resulted directly or indirectly from committing a
felony.

The decisions and reasoning of both cases, however,

are diametrically opposed.
In Schwartz, the District Judge of New Jersey concluded
that even though a passenger was injured at the time the
insured was fleeing from the police, and even though this
conduct constituted criminal recklessness, which was a felony
under New Jersey law, a sufficient causation had not been shown
since it was the accident itself which caused the insured's
death and not the related injury to the passenger.
In McDaniel, on the other hand, the Illinois Appellate
Court denied coverage on the basis that the insured had
violated two distinct felony provisions.

First, he had fled

from police officers and had caused bodily injury to another
person.

Secondly, he was guilty of criminal recklessness since

he recklessly caused injury to another person.

The court there

stated:
Plaintiffs have presented no facts and no reasonable
inference can be drawn which would indicate that
Phillip Winkler did anything but knowingly, or
recklessly, injure his passenger while fleeing an
officer. It is also a reasonable inference from the
record that he was guilty of criminal recklessness
under Indiana law. In either event, he was guilty of
a felony under those laws. Icl. at 1089-1090.
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Respondents submit that the analysis of the McDaniel court
is the correct one to apply in these types of cases.

The ques-

tion should not be whether the direct causal injury resulted
from all the elements of the felony since it may well be that
the insured is accidentally killed even in the commission of an
intentional felony.

Thus, the direct cause of death should not

be the focus, but rather, the question should be whether all of
the elements necessary to constitute a felony are present at
the time the insured is injured or killed.

Thus, in the

Schwartz case the correct analysis would be to conclude that
while the insured was causally killed by the automobile collision the death proximately resulted from the commission of
criminal recklessness and coverage should have been denied.
Likewise, in the instant case

Mr. Miller was causally

damaged by the automobile collision and that the collision
arose out of a manslaughter felony.

As long as all the ele-

ments necessary for the establishment of the felony exist and
as long as there is a proximate causation to the event of that
felony relating to the injuries or death, then the exclusion
clause must be applied.
This principle is further shown in two additional cases.
In Kaminsky v. Home Life Ins. Co., 258 N.Y.S.2d 266 (App. Div.
1965) a policy denied coverage to the insured if his death was
caused either directly or indirectly by the commission of a
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crime.

The insured attempted to choke his wife at which time

his wife stabbed the insured, causing his death.

His wife, in

seeking coverage, claimed that the stabbing was accidental.
The court denied coveraged based upon the following reasoning:
Kaminsky died as the proximate cause of the assault on
his wife. Whether or not he should have anticipated
his wife's reaction is not a matter that requires
trial. Mrs. Kaminsky was clearly being choked to
death. In these circumstances, regardless of what
Mr. Kaminsky might have anticipated and, for that
matter, regardless of Mrs. Kaminsky's intent, the
insured was engaged in a violent assault which provoked the stabbing, which resulted in his death. Even
if he had fallen on the knife while struggling with
his wife, so that his death might have been deemed
accidental, it would nevertheless have been occasioned
by his commission of the criminal act of assault. Id.
at 270.
In Waters v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 156 F.2d
470 (10th Cir. 1946), the insurer claimed that it was not liable for double indemnity benefits under a life policy because
the provision in that policy relieved the insurer from liability for death sustained in the connection with violation of law
by the insured.

Prior to decedent's death, he had been carry-

ing on the illicit manufacture of whiskey.

The cause of death

was electrocution which occurred when he took hold of an electric light attached to an extension cord in the room which was
filled with illicit whiskey.

Although the court stated that

for the exclusion to be applicable, the insurer was required to
prove a causal connection between the violation of the law and
the insured's death, the court held that a reasonable inference
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could be drawn from the evidence that there definitely was a
causal connection between the unlawful operation of the still
and the accidental death of the insured.

The exclusion was

upheld and the insurer was relieved of liability.
In conclusion, the reasoning now argued by Appellants
completely misconstrues the type of causation required in the
application of this type of clause.

The fallacy of Appellants'

arguments can be seen with the following hypothetical.

Assume

that an insured believes that his neighbor has been having an
affair with the insured's wife.

Assume further that the

insured confronts the neighbor on his lawn and engages in a
fistfight.

Assume further that under Utah law the fight is a

simple assault and constitutes only a misdemeanor.

Assume,

however, that as a result of the fight the insured sustains
injuries and the neighbor sustains injuries which later result
in the neighbor's death.

Finally, assume that the insured is

charged with manslaughter and is convicted of the second degree
felony.
Under Appellants' reasoning the policy provision would not
apply since Appellants would argue that the death of the neighbor had no causal connection to the injuries sustained by the
insured in the fight.

They would contend that it was merely a

misdemeanor fight which caused the injuries and that the fortuitous death of the neighbor resulting in a felony would not
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exclude coverage.
rejected.

Such an argument must be logically

It is obvious that the insured in such an instance

was injured as a result of his acts which gave rise to the
manslaughter felony.

Once the neighbor dies as a result of the

injuries sustained in the fight the clause becomes operative
since the final element required for a felony has taken place.
To simply say, as the Appellants have and as the Colorado
Supreme Court has, that the death of the neighbor has no causal
connection to the injuries of the insured completely misses the
intention of these type of clauses as well as misinterprets the
plain meaning of the English language.
There is no doubt that in the instance case defendant
Miller sustained his injuries as a result of the collision
which ultimately killed Mr. Heinz.

Miller's injuries are both

factually and proximately caused by the manslaughter offense
and to argue that there is no relationship between the commission of the felony and his injuries is nonsensical.

For these

reasons the lower court correctly concluded that the exclusion
clause prevented any recovery by the Appellants for the treatment and care of defendant Miller.
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POINT III
THE CLAUSE CONTAINED IN THE CAPITOL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY POLICY IS NOT AMBIGUOUS
AND WAS CORRECTLY INTERPRETED BY THE LOWER
COURT.
Appellants spend a number of pages in their Brief attempting to create various ambiguities and inconsistencies in the
language contained in the insurance policy.

While Appellants

have divided their attack into a number of subdivisions, their
arguments can be basically summarized under two contentions:
First, the felony of manslaughter which occurred by reckless
conduct is not the type of specific intent felony contemplated
by the insurance policy; secondly, only attempted felonies or
assaults are encompassed by the policy and since this felony
was actually committed it was not included.

(Appellants'

Brief, pp. 14-23).
There is nothing contained in the policy which requires a
"specific intent" for the "felony" to be excluded.

Appellants

are attempting to insert the word "intentional" felony into the
meaning of the policy when such word is clearly absent.

There

is no reason for the insurance carrier to exclude a reckless
felony such as the one involved in this case when the result is
manslaughter and encompasses the type of behavior which the
language of the policy is intended to exclude.
Even the definition of "recklessly" as quoted by the appellants does not support the argument they now make.
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Recklessly

as defined in § 76-2-103(0), UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended),
is synonymous with "maliciously."

The term "malice" is an evil

intent, a state of mind shown by the intentions to do, or the
intentional doing of something unlawful.
Dictionary, 2d College Ed., 1980).

(Webster's New World

In addition, the Utah

definition states that the perpetrator is aware of the unjustifiable risk that exists but consciously disregards that risk.
Contrary to Appellants' assertion, even a reckless act is in
many degrees "intentional."
The fact that Joel Miller was intoxicated at the time of
the commission of the felony is also immaterial to the state of
mind required.

Section 76-2-305, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as

amended) states "a person who is under the influence of voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances or
volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense shall
not thereby be deemed to be excused from criminal responsibility."

Likewise, § 76-2-306, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended),

states the following:
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a
criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the
existence of the mental state which is an element of
the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal
negligence establishes an element of an offense and
the actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary
intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a
prosecution of that offense.
Thus, as a matter of law, a person who is intoxicated
cannot claim that he is unaware of his conduct because of such
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intoxication.

It follows that he must be deemed to have inten-

tionally disregarded the risk by the conduct which he ultimately takes.
The courts in the previously cited cases have all held that
felony drunk driving in which a death or serious injury
occurred is the type of "felony" contemplated in these exclusion clauses.

See Mainer, Barker, Romero, supra.

Even the

Supreme Court of Colorado in the Penn Mutual case, upon which
Appellants rely in their causation argument, rejected the
notion now argued by Appellants as to the specific intent
requirement.

The Supreme Court of Colorado in that cause

stated:
The trial court directed the verdict, however, on the
ground that the only felony contemplated by the agreement was one in which an insured set out with "the
intent and purpose of committing a felony.
It is thereafter concluded that since the particular
felony involved did not meet this criterion, the
exclusionary provision could not take effect. For
reasons hereinafter set forth, we do not agree with
the basis of the trial court's holding . . . .
418 P.2d at 51.
Appellants make the statement that a person reading this
clause would interpret the word "felony" to include the criminal element that he was doing something wrong, that he was
committing a crime; doing something which all laypersons agree
is evil, bad and not in accordance with the general principles
of society.

(Appellants' Brief, p. 20). It is difficult to
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understand how, using this criteria, a layperson would not
conclude that drunk driving resulting in manslaughter would not
rise to the level of an evil and bad antisocial activity.
The quotations by Appellants as to the requirement of mens
rea in our criminal system is completely irrelevant to the
issue now before this Court.

Obviously, the requirement of a

specific intent is the norm with which criminal law proceeds.
The Legislature has, however, created a number of crimes which
are classified as felonies and which do not require a specific
mens rea because of the seriousness of the conduct taking
place.

For example, § 76-5-207, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as

amended), makes automobile homicide a felony of the third
degree if criminal negligence can be shown; § 76-6-106, UTAH
CODE ANN. (1953, as amended), makes criminal mischief a felony
of the third degree whenever a person recklessly propels an
object against a motor vehicle whether moving or standing;
§ 76-7-201, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended), makes the
non-support of children a felony of the third degree; and
§ 76-5-109, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended), classifies any
person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury
through reckless conduct a perpetrator of a third degree
felony.

Thus, the absence of a mens rea element in a felony

conviction does not mean that such crime is not of a serious
consequence which involves a grave evil to society.

-19-

The Oregon Supreme Court case cited by Appellants in their
Brief as to the definition of an "accident" is totally irrelevant to the discussion concerning felony.

Whether this inci-

dent was or was not an "accident" under the insurance policy is
immaterial since the sole question presented here is whether
the conduct amounted to a felony.

(See Appellants' Brief, pp.

21-23).
Finally, Appellants argue that the plain meaning of the
exclusion encompasses only attempted assaults or attempted
felonies.

(Appellants' Brief, pp. 17-18).

The plain meaning

of the clause "arising out of an attempt at assault or felony"
is simply that any conduct by the insured will not be covered
if it arises out of an effort to commit an assault or an effort
in which a felony has been committed.

The phrase "an attempt

at assault" encompasses those instances where an insured
attempts to inflict harm upon another but is unsuccessful.
See, e.g., Bernard v. First National Life Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d
913 (Fla. 1971); Martin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
463 S.W.2d 681 (Pa. 1971); and Quaker City Life Ins. Co. v.
Futson, 115 S.E.2d 699 (Ga. App. 1960).
As previously discussed, any conduct which "arises out of a
felony" is also excluded regardless of whether the felony
requires a specific mens rea.

Furthermore, since attempts to

commit a felony are themselves felonies, attempted felony
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actions are also excluded.

§ 76-4-101, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953,

as amended).
The language contained in the insurance policy of this case
is considerably more liberal than that which has been upheld in
other cases.

For example, many policies preclude recovery when

the insured has committed a

,,

crimeM or has violated the "law."

See 43 AM. JUR. 2d § 579, Insurance, pp. 646-650; 45 C.J.S.
§ 785, Insurance, pp. 824-826.

Under these provisions even a

misdemeanor violation has been held to preclude recovery by an
insured.

Thus, the requirement of the policy in this case that

such exclusion only apply to "felonies" is a fair and equitable
attempt by the insurance carrier to only exclude reprehensible
conduct which as a matter of public policy should not be
financed by other policy holders.
In conclusion, the language contained in the insurance
policy issued to defendant Joel Miller is clear and unambiguous.

While Appellants attempt to construct various degrees of

interpretation of this language, the facts giving rise to this
case leave no question but that the manslaughter conviction of
Miller is the type of "felony" included in the exclusion provision.

Appellants have attempted by the use of contorted lexi-

cology to assert that the reckless and drunk driving of defendant Joel Miller resulting in the death of an innocent motorist
is somehow not the type of evil conduct excluded by these type
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of provisions.

The lower court was eminently correct in con-

cluding that this clause excluded any coverage for the injuries
of Miller.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of these types of clauses is to reduce improper
risks from insurance coverage.

It is hardly appropriate for

policy holders to have to pay premiums to support the medical
bills of someone who is shot in a bank holdup, injured in a
barroom brawl, or killed because of their own drunk driving.
Certainly second degree manslaughter cannot be dismissed as
extremely serious conduct which should not be covered by insurance benefits.

Mr. Miller intentionally became intoxicated,

intentionally drove an automobile, and unfortunately is now
suffering both physically and financially as a result of his
actions.

The tragedy to all those involved in this accident

can never be eliminated regardless of what monetary adjustments
are made.

However, the policyholders of Capitol Life Insurance

Company should not also be made to suffer by imposing coverage
for a risk which was clearly excluded by the policy.
The judgment of the lower court shall be affirmed.
DATED this 17th day of March, 1986.

SCM0049X
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